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Abstract 
The NASA system safety framework is in the process of change, motivated by the desire to promote an objectives-
driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety efforts on system-level safety performance, and 
serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in 
gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. An objecti\cs-driven approach to system safety affords more flexibility to 
determine, on a system-specific basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and verified. Such flexibility and 
efficiency is becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering modalities and acquisition models, 
where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for transportation services to low-earth-
orbit. A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-informed safety case (RISC): a structured 
argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is 
OT will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The Rise addresses each of the objectives 
defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making informed risk acceptance decisions at relevant decision 
points in the system life cycle. 
Introduction 
Tne NASA system safety framework is in the process of change. A major motivation for this change is the desire to 
promote an objectives-driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety efforts on system-level 
safety performance, and serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related activities that otherwise niight be done 
in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. An objectives-driven approach to system safety 
affords more flexibility to determine, on a system-specific basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and 
\'erified. Such flexibility and efficiency is becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering 
modalities and acquisition models, where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for 
transportation services to low-earth-orbit. A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-
iniormed safety case (RISC): a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is or win be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. 
The RiSe addresses each of the objectives defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making informed risk 
acceptance decisions at relevant deciSIon points in the system life cycle. The RISe is not an add-on to today's system 
safety practices; it is a means of organizing existing, often disparate, system safety products such as failure modes and 
effects analyses (FMEAs), hazard analyses (HAs), and probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) into a unified, coherent, 
evidence-based argument that the required level of safety has been attained. In addition to fwnishing the risk acceptance 
rationale, the RISe can serve as a roadmap for risk management during deployment, including activities such as 
precursor analysis, a process for learning from flight experience that is now considered a necessity for risk management 
of human space flight. 
The recently published NASA System Sqfety Handbook [I] presents the system safety framework and provides guidance 
for its implementation. It provides a structured model for planning, conducting, and documenting system safety 
activities in a manner that meets stakeholder objectives and provides the teclmical basis for risk acceptance. The 
framework consists of the following system safety clements: safety objectives, system safety activities, risk-informed 
safety case (RISC) ·preparation, RiSe evaluation, and Rise approval, as illustrated in Figure 1. The framework is 
in:plemented in a negotiated fashion between system Acquirers and system Providers I, Safety objectives, RISe 
evaluation, and RIse approval are the within the purview of dlC Acquirer, whereas system safety activities and R1SC · 
preparation are within the purview of the Provider. 
I An Acquirer is a NASA organization that tasks a subordinate organization to produce a product or deliver a service. 
The Acquirer is responsible for safety assurance, i.e., the development of confidence that safety has been sufficiently 
ensured by the Provider, such that a decision can be made to accept the safety risk of the system. A Provider is a NASA 
or contractor organization that is responsible for safety ensurance, i.e., the reduction and elimination of system hazards 
and the achievement of adequate safety perfonnance through design, procurement, fabrication, con!Joiruction, and in the 
case ofa service provider. operation. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140010745 2019-08-31T19:34:48+00:00Z
r··········--·----------···-·- ------···--------------- ------------------------ .. -----, i Acquirer i 
: Saft.ty ObJecttYI!Is 1 
: 1nd Assoa~ Requtrmtents 
: (define silfety) 
, 
, 
... _---- ""'-_ .• --- --- - -_. - --- - ---- -- -- -- --: 
, 
System SIIety __ 
(achtew.: we system and produa- eYldeoncel 
Provider , 
... _----------------------------------_ .. _-- ______ ' 
Figure I - The System Safety Framework 
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Relationship of System Safety to Systems Engineering and Risk Management: The approach to system safety 
articulated in this Standard recognizes the substantial overlap between systems engineering, risk management, and 
system safety. Both risk management and systems engineering are concerned with the achievement of organizational 
objectives. Broadly speaking, systems engineering is the means by which the objectives are met, and the role of risk 
management is to provide a control function for systems engineering to assure that the development is, and will remain, 
on track to meet the objectives, across all mission execution domains, including safety, technica1, cost, and schedule. 
System safety is a subset of both systems engineering and risk management. Considering that the safety performance of 
a system is a stakeholder concern in much the same way that technical performance capabilities such as payload mass to 
orbit are stakeholder concerns, system safety is an integral part of systems engineering efforts to develop a system that 
satisfies stakeholder objectives. System safety is also an objecti ve of risk management efforts to identify and respond to 
conditions that may arise that threaten the achievement of the system's baselined safety performance. 
Although each mission execution domain has unique characteristics, system performance in the safety domain is of 
particular concern to NASA, as reflected in safety being a NASA core value [2). Moreover, safety performance is 
typically probabilistic, in that adverse safety consequences occur only sporadically, which means that I) safety 
performance is not directly observable, but must be inferred; and 2) assessments of safety performance are inherently 
Wlcerta1n, since they are subject to the same margin of error considerations that apply to stochastic phenomena 
generally. 
Relationsbip of the Evolving Framework to MIL.STp-882: System safety has traditionally focused on identifying and 
controlling individual hazards, as exemplified by standards such as MIL·STD-882, Depanment of Defense Standard 
Practice - System Safety [3], which has been a primary reference document for system safety since its initial release in 
July of 1969. MlL·STD·882 identifies the Department of Defense (DoD) systems engineering approach to eliminating 
hazards, where possible, and minimizing risks where those hazards cannot be eliminated. It covers hazards as they 
apply to systems / products / equipment / infrastructure (including both hardware and software) througbout desigo, 
development, test, production, use, and disposal . The intent of the NASA system safety framework is to build upoo, 
rather than replace, standards such as MIL·STD·882 by addressing NASA-specific needs that go beyond those 
addressed in existing documents. 
Safety Objectives and Associated Requirements 
As discussed in NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements [4], at the outset of a program or 
project, the objectives, deliverables, perfonnance measures, baseline performance requirements, resources, and 
schedules that define the task to be performed are negotiated between the organizational unit performing the task 
(Provider) and the organizational unit responsible for oversigbt (Acquirer). As part of this process, a set of safety 
objectives is negotiated consistent with the two fundamental safety principles, namely meeting minimum tolerable 
levels of safety and being as safe as reasonably practical (ASARP). 
Minimum TolerabJe Levels of Safety Performance: Setting minimum levels of safety perfonnance involves 
consideration not only of societal issues relating to safety. but also of what is feasible given current capabilities and 
technological development potential. It involves the conduct of safety studies by the Acquirer during pre· Formulation to 
better understand the safety risks inyolved. Minimum levels of safety performance are not necessarily constant over the 
life of a system. An initial level of safety performance may be accepted for a developmental system, with the 
expectation that it will be improved as failure modes are "wrung out" over time. In such cases the level of tolerable 
safety can be expressed as a safety threshold against which initial system performance is assessed, and a safety goal 
against which future performance will be assessed. Figure 2 illustrates a safety threshold and safety goal for a generic 
safety performance measure. 
Slandard of "Mlnlmall~ safe tnIIiIIIll)'" 
less than this would be "Intolerable" 
Standard of "MlnImIIlly SlIfe tOl' Long Term OperatIon" 
L.es.s than this Is tolerable. c:onditiONl 
011 contlnu0U5 S8fery Improwment 
Tolerable 
-
Continuous Safety Improvement 
) 
Figure 2 - Safety Threshold and Safety Goal for a Generic Safety Performance Measure 
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) [5] and others have raised the need to consider the gap between actual 
risk and explicitly quantified risk when applying safety thresholds and goals. This concern reflects the expectation that 
during the early stages of operation there is likely to be significant risk from unknown and/or underappreciated (UU) 
sources. NASA's agency-level safety thresholds and goals do not explicitly address the question of how to account for 
these contributors to system risk. One possible approach is imbedded in the concept of safety perfonnance margin 
(referred to in the NASA System Safety Handbook as safety risk reserve). In the safety performance margin approach, 
the actual risk of a system is understood to be the sum of the risk from known sources, as explicitly quanti fled using 
traditional risk analysis methods, plus the risk from UU sources, accounted for by the safety performance margin. This 
approach is illustrated in Figure 3 in a single-mission context. In a multiple-mission context, or for a single unit 
operated over a long period of time, the safety performance margin would start at an initial value consistent with 
historical information about like systems, and subsequently diminish with time as safety performance information is 
gained through system operation (including tests). 
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Figure 3 - Safety Performance Margin in a Single-Mission Context 
As Safe As Reasonably Practicable: A determination that a system is ASARP entails weighing its safety perfonnance 
against the commitments and tradeoffs needed to further improve it. The system is ASARP if an incremental 
improvement in safety would require an intolerable or disproportionate deterioration of system performance in other 
areas. Thus, a system that is ASARP is one where safety is given the highest priority within the constraints of 
operational effectiveness, time, and cost, throughout all phases of the system life cycle. Being ASARP is a separate and 
distinct consideration from meeting a minimum tolerable level of safety. ASARP makes no explicit reference to the 
absolute yalue ofa system's safety performance or the tolerability of that performance. It is strictly concerned with the 
system's safety performance relative to that of other identified alternatives. ASARP reflects a mindset of continuous 
safety improvement regardless of the current level of safety. It is an integral aspect of a good systems engineering 
process that guides risk-informed decision making throughout the system life cycle. Correspondingly, the condition of 
ASARP is demonstrated to some extent through process considerations. Figure 4 illustrates the ASARP region for a 
generic set of alternatives. 
® 
@ 
Large increases in safety can be achieved by addressing low hanging fruit. little 
cost/schedule/technical impact for doing so. 
Low hanging fruit has been addressed. but significant increases in safety can still be 
"bought" without failing to meet cost/schedule/technical performance requirements 
Limit of ASARP regime has been reached.. Increased sifety cannot be '"bought" 
withcutexceeding tolerable limits of costlschedule/technical performance 
Limit of achievable safety has been reached. Increased safety cannot be '"bought" at 
a"yeast. 
Int"...,bl. 
ASARP 
Region 
Cost/Schedule/Technlcal Performance 
Cost/$chedule/Technical 
Performance 
Intolerable 
Marginal 
• Tolerable/Desirable 
Figure 4 - As Safe As Reasonably Practicable 
Operational Safety Objectives: The two fundamental principles decomposed into specific safety objectives to be met by 
the system. By specifying safety objectives down to a level where they can be clearly addressed by systems engineering 
processes, an operational definition of safety is created that enables the processes to be developed and evaluated in 
terms of the safety objectives. By adequately meeting these so-called operational safety objectives, then by virtue of 
their derivation from fundamental safety principles, the system can be said to be adequately safe. Figure 5 illustrates the 
derivation of generic operational safety objectives, including the application of safety perfonnance margin to minimum 
tolerable levels of safety, so that safety requirements can be developed that mi;tintain a reserve for the expected presence 
of unknown andlor underappreciated scenarios. The figure shows that even in the absence of minimum tolerable levels 
of safety, the ASARP principle is still operative. Traditional, detenninistic safety practices such as requiring 
redundancy where practical have implicitly recognized the ASARP principle as fundamental to system safety. 
The transition from safety objectives, which are defined by the Acquirer, to system safety activities, which are 
conducted by the Provider, is accomplished by translating the objectives into safety requirements that the Acquirer then 
le\ies on the Provider. The development of safety requirements is the purview of the Technical Requirements 
Definition Process of the NASA Systems Engineering Engine presented in NPR 7123.lA, NASA Systems Engineering 
Processes and Requirements [6]. It is carried out collaboratively between the Provider and the Acquirer, but the 
evaluation regarding the appropriateness of the collection of safety requirements resides with the Acquirer. Early in the 
system life cycle the Provider conducts a System Safety Requirements Analysis (SSRA). The SSRA serves to clarify 
what detailed requirements (including, but not limited to, engineering requirements) the Provider expects to address in 
the ensuing development, and which form the basis of the Provider's System Safety Management Plan (SSMP). In 
addition, the SSMP focuses on the collection of process requirements. Figure 6 illustrates the interaction/iteration 
between the Acquirer and Provider during the development of system-specific safety requirements. 
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Figure 6 - Interaction/Iteration between the Acquirer and Provider during the Development 
of System-Specific Safety Requirements 
System Safety Activities 
System safety activities are conducted by the Provider as part of overall systems engineering technical process 
activities. System safety activities are focused on the achievement of the stated safety objectives. System safety 
activities not only ensure the safety of the system, but also produce the evidence of safety that will be used to support 
claims in the ruSCs provided to the Acquirer at key decision points in the system life cycle. Because of the diversity of 
Providers, each with its own particular set of systems engineering, system safety, and risk management processes, 
NASA recognizes the need for flexibility in the nature and composition of system safety activities, as long as they are 
aole to achieve their operational safety objectives. System safety activities typically fall into the general categories of: 
Conducting an Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA); Requirements Development Support; System Design Support; 
Program Control and Commitments Support; and Performance Monitoring Support. 
Conducting an ISA: ISA includes methods for identifying and characterizing potential accident scenarios. This includes 
accident causes, contributing factors, effectiveness of controls (both existing and proposed), subsystem interactions, 
aT'talysis of physical responses of the system to the environments it encounters, and ana1ysis of the probability that the 
undesirable consequences will be realized. ISA integrates different types of safety analyses (e.g., FMEA, PRA, 
phenomenological modeling) to the greatest extent possible. The ISA consolidates these separate analyses to produce a 
single comprehensive set of quantified safety performance measures that can be used to assess the standing of the 
system with respect to the levied safety performance requirements. The ISA is then used to risk-infonn system design 
and operational decision-making.' The ISA must be tailored to the particular phase in the life cycle at which it is 
conducted. As the system design evolves, the ISA is kept current, typically through the use of progressively more 
rigorous analysis techniques that model the system at progressively finer levels of detail. The ISA is maintained during 
system realization so that it can be used to inform decisions related to safety, such as test protocols. During system 
o!,)eration, the ISA is updated to reflect such things as design modifications and accumulating operational experience, 
including anomalies. 
Requirements Development Support: Through the early conduct of an SSRA, the Provider identifies applicable 
requirements by reviewing NASA, military, and industry standards and specifications, historical documentation on 
similar and legacy systems, etc. Additionally, using the ISA, the Provider translates any system- level probabilistic 
safety performance requirements levied by the Acquirer into objectively verifiable system-specific derived requirements 
(and associated verification procedures) that protect the assumptions underlying the system's assessed safety 
performance. Such derived requirements may involve, for example, prescribing specific levels of component reliability, 
specifying limits on environments produced by components such as particulate emissions or vibrations, or requiring a 
certain level of failure tolerance in a subsystem. In cases where the flowdown of requirements crosses organizational 
boundaries, the ISA provides a rational basis for a1locating requirements to subordinate organizations. It may be the 
cc,se that a levied requirement proves to be overly burdensome (such as by adding too much mass to the system) or sub-
optimal (e.g., where alternate means are available to meet the intent of the requirement). System safety plays a role in 
these cases by assessing the potential consequences of tailoring the requirement, both through explicit modeling of 
safety performance using the ISA, and by qualitative consideration of the potential erosion of protection against 
unknown and underappreciated scenarios. This prmides a technical basis for tailoring the requirement. 
System Design SuPPort: System design support is of two broad types: best-practice-informed and ISA-informed. Best-
practice-informed design support promotes safety by identifying applicable historically-applied safety-related 
er.gineering requirements and by assuring that proyen strategies for optimizing safety are considered during system 
design decisions. ISA-informed support promotes safety by risk-infonning design decisions with an assessment of the 
safety performance of each contending alternative. These two types of design support work synergistically to achieve a 
design that is ASARP. 
Program Control and Commitments Sunnort: System safety promotes the development of program controls and 
commitments needed to ensure that the framework for safety is backed by sound administrative and management 
practices. Of particular importance to the maintenance of the system's safety performance is the identification of safety-
CTltical items (SCls) that are explicitly relied on for safety. A major vehicle for SCI identification is the ISA, which is 
used to identify the hardware, software, human, operational, and managerial system features upon which safe system 
operation depends. Such items can be explicit in the ISA (e.g., redundancies, backup systems) or they can be implicit 
(e.g., assumptions regarding component structural integrity). In either case, designating these items as safety-critical 
protects their safety functions by imposing rigorous and highly visible safety management provisions on them. The 
adequacy of safety-critical item designation is ultimately at the discretion of the Acquirer, and may include (for 
example) items associated with safety-related engineering requirements levied for reasons such as defense-in-depth or 
margin preservation, independent of the ISA. Other aspects of program controls and commitments covered within the 
system safety framework but not necessarily as part of an ISA include configuration management, quality assurance, 
training and certification of personnel, use of best practices and lessons learned, and assurance that safety requirements 
are being complied with. Any specific levied requirements, controls, and commitments that are considered critical to 
safety could be designated as SCls. 
Performance Monitoring SupPOrt: System safety supports effective performance monitoring, both in the development of 
rnonitoring protocols and in responding to performance data. The ISA is used to risk-inform the selection of system 
attributes that will be monitored, both to ensure that significant uncertainties are reduced as experience accumulates and 
to ensure that important performance-related assumptions in the ISA remain valid over the system life cycle. 
A~omalous performance data are scrutinized for their potential impact on safety (e.g. , via accident precursor analysis 
[7]) and managed accordingly. 
RISC Development 
A RISC is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and 
val id case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. It addresses each of 
the operational safety objectives of the system, including plans for achieving safety objectives that are applicable to 
I. ter phases of the system life cycle. In the context of NASA systems engineering, the RISC refers to the totality of 
safety-related documentation submitted to a given technical review. As such, the documentation requirements of the 
RiSe are consistent with the entrance criteria for the relevant review, as itemized in NPR 7123.1A. Similarly, the 
criteria for evaluating the adequacy of the RISe are consistent with the corresponding technical review success criteria 
in the same NPR. 
The elements ofthe RISC are [8]: 
• An explicit set of safety claims about the system(s), for example, the probability of an accident or a group of 
accidents is low 
• Evidence justifying the claims, for example, representative operating history, redundancy in design, or results 
of analysis 
• Structured safety arguments that link claims to evidence and that use logical1y valid rules of inference 
T;1e interaction of these elements is illustrated in Figure 7 for a safety claim supported by two independent arguments. 
Argument Structure 
Sub-daim EvIdence Evidence 
Figure 7 - A Safety Claim Supported by Two Independent Arguments 
The concept of adequate safety requires that safety be addressed throughout all phases of the system life cycle. 
Correspondingly, the RISC must also address the full system life cycle, regardless of the particular point in the life 
cycle at which the RISC is developed. This manifests in the RISC as two distinct types of safety claims: 
• Claims related to the safety objectives of the current or previous phases argue that the objectives have been 
met. 
• Claims related to the safety objectives of future phases argue that a 'roadmap' has been established for the 
satisfaction of objectives yet to be met, i.e., that necessary plans, preparations, and commitments are in place to 
meet safety objectives at the appropriate time. 
T~e form of the RISe arguments for accomplished objectives vs. upcoming objectives is shown in Figure 8 for the 
point in time at which design has completed and realization is about to commence. As the system proceeds in the life 
cycle and ruses are developed for successive milestones, arguments demonstrating an ability and commitment to 
meeting objectives are replaced by arguments demonstrating accomplishment of objectives. 
Upon submittal of the RISC to the Acquirer, the Acquirer, usually through a designated E,aluation Team (referred to as 
the Evaluator), conducts an e,aluation of the RISC to determine the technical adequacy of its safety claims. RISC 
evaluation is carried out based on defined evaluation protocols for the system at a particular point in its life cycle. For 
eaoh claim in the RISe, it is the task of the Acquirer to: 
• Understand the evidence behind the claims 
• Evaluate the evidence to determine its validity 
• Provide judgment as to \alidity of the claims 
In other words, to "aluate the RISe, the claims in the Rise are critically reviewed, thereby making use of the 
collected evidence related to the safety of the system. 
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Figure 8 - Coverage of the System Life Cycle in the RlSC 
RISC Evaluation 
OpotaUon 
The Evaluator ultimately rates the RISC overall as being Acceptable or Unacceptable. In order to provide 
rationale that the RIse is acceptable, the Evaluator must be able to infer from the evidence in its totality that the top 
claim (e.g., that the system is adequately safe) has been substantiated to high confidence. The ability to make this 
inference is based on the Evaluator's knowledge of the system as a whole and of the various combinations of 
requirements that have to be satisfied in order for the system to be deemed safe. In the evaluation process, it is 
important for the reviewer(s) to e"aluate the RISe from a critical viewpoint, examining the supporting evidence as 
necessary to develop confidence in the claims at all levels. The output of the RIse evaluation is a set of evaluation 
findings summarizing the review and indicating potential areas of weakness in the RISe. 
The expectation is that the prospective Provider should understand in advance the eventual evaluation process 
te ",hich the RISC will be subjected. OSafety case evaluation is part of the Acquirer's risk management process. It is a 
particular instance of suppcrting a risk acceptance decision. Requirements of NPR 8000.4A must therefore be 
. addressed. In particular, the risk communication protocols established between the acquiring organization and the 
providing organization should be understood to be operating within the framework set forth in NPR 8000.4A. 
RI SC Approval 
RlSC approval is granted when the Acquirer is satisfied that the technical basis of the RiSe is sound. The approved 
RlSC, communicated in the form of a RISC Report, and the RISC e"luation, communicated in the form of a RISC 
Evaluation Report, become the safety-specific technical bases supporting the decision for which the RISC was 
developed. RISC approval entails a commitment to maintaining the validity of the RISC as approved, upon which the 
Acquirer's decision will be predicated. As such, the commitments and understandings captured in the RISC approval 
become part of the performance baseline to be managed subsequently under the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) 
elements of NPR 8000AA. The risk of a shortfall in safety performance relative to this baseline is managed under the 
same risk management process within which all other performance risks are managed. If thresholds have been 
established for safety performance risk, then risk elevation will be required should threshold satisfaction be threatened 
by emergent conditions. NPR 8000.4A impcses requirements on organizational units (e.g., Acquirer and Provider) to 
coord~nate risk management between the two organizations. The requirements in NPR 8000.4A are general, cutting 
across mission execution domains, but, as noted previously. the high-level protocols in this Handbook are essentially 
system-safety-specific instantiations of the general risk management requirements in NPR 8000AA. 
System Safety throughout the System Life Cycle 
NASA programs and projects are managed to life cycles, the division of the program's and project's activities over the 
fu ll lifetime of the program or project, based on the expected maturity of program and project information and products 
as they move through defined phases in the life cycle. Figure 9 shows a simplified version of a project's life cycle to 
illu~1rate the relationship between the phases, the key decision points and application of the system safety framework. 
(P"ograrn and project life-cycle phases are described in NPR 7123.18.) The vertical thickness of each shape in the 
figure is intended to notionally indicate the level of effort and/or rigor of each activity. ]n general, it is expected that 
adequate safety performance is best assured when system safety activities are conducted beginning early in the system 
life cycle. 
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Figure 9 - Life-Cycle Perspective on the System Safety Framework (Notional) 
Conclusion 
The NASA System Safety Handbook presents a system safety framework that provides a coherent structure for 
organizing system safety activities towards the achievement and demonstration of safety throughout the system life 
cycle. Within the framework, system safety activities are organized around the accomplishment of clearly stated safety 
objectives that collectively define adequate safety for the system, and are communicated to decision makers via the 
RISC, which provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid argument, supported by evidence, that the system is or 
will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. 
Acknowledgements 
ne authors express their gratitude to present and past NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) leaders 
for their support and encouragement in developing this document. The authors also recognize the contributions made by 
Bob Youngblood (INL), Allan Benjamin (consultant), Curtis Smith (INL), Dev Sen (ISL), Martin Feather (JPL), and 
Pete Rutledge (QA&RMS). The development effort leading to this document was conducted in stages, and was 
su~ported through reviews and discussions by the NASA System Safety Steering Group (S3G) and others. 
References 
I. NASNSP-2010-580, NASA System Safety Handbook Volume 1 - System Safety Framework and Concepts for 
In·.plementation, Washington, DC. 2011. 
2. NASA Strategic Plan 2014, Washington, DC. 2014. 
3. MIL-STD-882E, Department of Defense Standard Practice - System Safety, May 2012. 
4. ~ASA Procedural Requirement 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, December 2008. 
5. Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report for 2012, Washington, DC. January 2013. 
6. NASA Procedural Requirement 7123.lA, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, Washington, 
DC. 2007. 
7. NASNSP-2011-3423, NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Washington, DC. 2011. 
8. Bishop P. and Bloomfield R. A Methodology for Safety Case Development, Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, 
Birmingham, UK. 1998. 
Biograohy 
Homayoon Dezfuli, Ph.D., NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, 300 E Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20546, email- hdezfuli@nasa.gov. 
Dr. Dezfuli is the NASA System Safety Technical Fellow and the Manager of System Safety at NASA Headquarters 
OSMA. In these roles, he serves as a senior technical expert for the Agency in system safety methodology and practice 
and leads NASA's policy development initiatives for system safety and risk management. Dr. Dezfuli has been 
instrumental in developing and implementing advanced system safety and risk management techniques and processes 
for the Agency. He led the development of and co-authored the NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
Procedures Guide, NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook, NASA Risk Management Handbook, and NASA 
System Safety Handbook. He is also the co-author of the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook and is the author or 
co-author of many papers in the areas of safety, risk assessment, and risk management. He devised a safety goal 
implementation framework that has helped shape the NASA safety goal policy for human space flight. Dr. Dezfuli is 
currently leading the development of a case-based assurance framework for Safety and Mission Success. Dr. Dezfuli 
has a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from the University of Maryland. 
Chris Everett, Energy and Space Division, Information Systems Laboratories, 710 West End Ave., New York, NY 
10025, email - ceverett@islinc.com. 
Mr. Everett is a safety and risk analyst with twenty-eight years experience supporting government agencies and private-
sector clients in the areas of systems safety, risk assessment, and risk management. He is currently supporting NASA in 
the development of system safety and risk management processes and guidance, the conduct of risk assessments, and 
the development of computer-based risk assessment tools. He is a ctrauthor of the NASA Accident Precursor Analysis 
Handbook, the NASA Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook, the NASA Risk Management Handbook, and the 
NASA System Safety Handbook. He was project manager and co-developer of the Dynamic Abort Risk Evaluator 
(DARE), which assessed the effectiveness of Shuttle and Ares I aborts. 
Frank Groen, Ph.D., NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, 300 E Street SW, Washington, DC 
20546, email - frank.j.groen@nasa.gov. 
D:-. Groen is the Director of Safety and Assurance Requirements Division (SARD) within NASA Headquarters OSMA. 
In this position, Dr. Groen is responsible for the development and maintenance of NASA directives and standards 
pertaining to Safety and Mission Assurance, as well as related methods, tools and guidance. Prior to his current 
position, Dr. Groen worked in OSMA as the Manager for Reliability and Maintainability at OSMA, and also served as 
the document manager for NASA's Human Rating directive and program executive for NASA's ELV Payload Safety 
program. During this period, he introduced the safety goal policy for human spaceflight missions into the Human-
Rating directive, oversaw the development of an accident precursor analysis methodology for NASA, and initiated an 
objectives-driven approach for the standardization of R&M activities. Prior to entering NASA, Dr. Groen was active in 
academia and industry, where he focused on method and tool development in the field of reliability and risk assessment, 
with a focus on Bayesian data analysis, accident scenario modelling and analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation. Dr. 
Groen received his PhD in Reliability Engineering from the University of Maryland in 2000 and a MSc in Mechanical 
Engineering from the Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. . 
